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Nontechnical summary   
 
In this paper we compare the relative superiority of floating exchange 
rates, the dollar-peg and the basket-peg, in a small open economy.  We 
measure relative superiority in terms of economic welfare under several 
different policy objective functions.  We have in mind a country such as 
Thailand, one of the nations hit hard by the Asian currency and economic 
crisis of 1997-98.  The policy objectives we consider are GDP stability, 
current account stability and bahts-dollar exchange rate stability.  All 
objectives are defined in terms of the policy authority’s loss function.  The 
exogenous change that raises the loss initially is a change in the 
dollar-yen rate.  Our theoretical analysis clarifies the direct and indirect 
effects of this exogenous change on the variables which the authorities 
are trying to stabilize.  This is followed by our empirical analysis using Thai 
data, which sheds light on the relative superiority of the different regimes 
under the different objectives.     
The following is a summary of results.         
(i)  The relative superiority of the different exchange rate regimes 
depends on the policy objective.     
(ii)  Because exchange risk is explicit in our model, the floating 
exchange rate regime is shown to be more costly than in models 
without  exchange  risk.   
(iii)  An exogenous change in the yen-dollar exchange rate has all or 
some of the following effects on the policy objective variables: 蝀direct 
effect of the original change in the yen-dollar rate; 蝁indirect effect of 
increased risk due to the induced change in the bahts-dollar rate; 蝂
indirect effect of increased risk due to the induced change in the 
bahts-yen rate; 蝃indirect effect via increased expectation of bahts 
devaluation.   
(iv)  When the objective is GDP stability or current account stability, 01/09/05 
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effects  蝀,  蝁 and 蝂 exist under floating exchange rates as well as the 
basket-peg, and effects  蝀,  蝂 and 蝃  exist under the dollar-peg.     
(v)  When the objective is GDP stability or current account stability, the 
direct effect (effect 蝀) is definitely smaller (and the indirect effects are 
possibly smaller) under the basket-peg compared to the dollar-peg 
regime.  This is because the effects of changes in the bahts-yen and 
the bahts-dollar exchange rates cancel each other out in this model 
with three currencies.  However, this conclusion presupposes that trade 
with Japan is yen-denominated and trade with the USA is 
dollar-denominated.   
(vi)  When the objective is stability of the bahts-dollar exchange rate, 
the optimal regime is the dollar-peg where none of the four effects exist.   
Effect  蝁 exists under floating and effect 蝀 under the dollar-peg.  On 
the other hand, this is the only case where the dollar-peg is the optimal 
choice.   
(vii)  Under floating exchange rates, the policy variable available to 
authorities is the money supply.  Under the dollar-peg and the 
basket-peg, money supply is no longer available to stabilize GDP or the 
current account.  Thus if monetary policy is effective in minimizing the 
loss, floating is an optimal choice whatever the policy goal.     
(viii)  Under the basket-peg, money supply is not available as a policy 
variable to minimize the loss.  Money supply becomes instead a tool to 
stabilize the exchange rate(s).  However, it is possible to use the 
weights on currency exchange rates in the basket as a policy variable.  
If these weights can be set to optimal values (i.e. values that minimize 
the loss function), the basket-peg is an optimal choice whatever the 
policy  goal.   
(ix)  The dollar-peg can attain optimality only when the policy goal is 
to stabilize the bahts-dollar exchange rate (and other objectives not 
independent from the bahts-dollar rate objective), unless some other 01/09/05 
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policy tool (such as fiscal policy) becomes available.    The dollar-peg is 
the worst choice among the three, if the respective policy variables are 
used optimally under the other two exchange rate regimes.     
(x)  The use of trade weights (exports plus imports with a particular 
trade-partner country divided by overall exports plus imports) as weights in 
a currency basket is optimal only in special cases.  An example of this 
special case is when the following sufficient conditions are met: (i) the 
policy objective is that the country’s total trade (exports plus imports) 
with the rest of the world does not diverge from the desired equilibrium 
level, (ii) exports and imports depend only on nominal exchange rates, 
(iii) the elasticity of total trade with respect to the nominal exchange 
rate is the same for the two trading partners, (iv) there are only two 
trading partners whose currencies are the only two currencies in the 
basket and (v) the shock to the economy takes the form of a change in 
the exchange rate between the two currencies in the basket.     
(xi)  In general, the optimal weights in the basket are functions of all or 
some of the following partial derivatives: 蝀response of bond demand to 
interest rate; 蝁response of bond demand to rate of return on foreign 
investment;  蝂wealth effect on bond demand; 蝃response of bond 
demand to exchange risk; 蝄response of bond demand to GDP; 蝅
response of investment to interest rate; 蝆 response of goods and 
services demand to exchange rate; 蝇response of goods and services 
demand to exchange risk; 蝈response of goods and services demand 
to GDP;  蝉response of foreign bond demand to interest rate;  蝊response 
of foreign bond demand to rate of return on foreign investment; 蝋
response of foreign bond demand to GDP, 蝌wealth effect on foreign 
bond demand.     
(xii)  Using Thailand’s macroeconomic data, our empirical analysis 
shows that, as expected, losses are zero under all policy objectives 
when money supply is set to optimal values under floating exchange 01/09/05 
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rates, as well as when the weights in the basket are set to optimal values 
under  the  basket-peg.   
(xiii)   In pegging to a basket of bahts-dollar and bahts-yen exchange 
rates, the optimal weight on the bahts-dollar exchange rate is between 
0.56 and 1 (depending on the policy goal).  Thailand’s data shows the 
trade-weight on the bahts-dollar exchange rate is 0.4, and our empirical 
analysis confirms our theoretical result that losses are higher using 
trade-weights  as  basket-weights.   
(xiv)  Using trade weights as basket weights under the basket–peg leads 
to higher losses than not using money supply at all under floating 




One of the factors often cited as the cause of the recent Asian currency 
crisis is the virtual peg of the domestic currency against the US dollar.   For 
this reason, there has been much discussion about the desirable 
exchange rate regime for small open economies such as those hit by the 
crisis.   
Existing analyses on basket-peg regimes include Ito, Ogawa and Sasaki 
(1998), which concentrate on the market for traded goods.  In contrast, 
ours is a general equilibrium model of five markets as in Yoshino and 
Fujimaru (1999).  Our analysis differs from Yoshino and Fujimaru (1999) in 
the following ways. We (1) adopt the stock-equilibrium approach to 
exchange rate determination, (2) explicitly take exchange risk into 
account and (3) analyze the relationship between the policy objectives 
and exchange rate regimes.  Specifically, we ask which among the 
basket-peg, dollar-peg and floating exchange rate regimes result in the 
lowest value of the different loss functions corresponding to the different 
policy objectives.  The policy objectives we analyze are stabilities in 
domestic GDP, in the current account and in the exchange rate against 
the dollar.  We also (4) calculate the optimal weights in a currency 
basket.  Our theoretical analysis is followed by our empirical analysis 
using Thai data.     
The main results can be summarized as follows.  One, the optimal choice 
of exchange rate regime for a small open economy depends on its policy 
objective.  In other words, it is not productive to discuss which regime 
should be chosen by such a country, without first specifying the policy 
goal.   
Two, gains from adopting a basket-peg is larger when the county uses the 
yen in trade with Japan, the dollar in trade with the USA.     
Three, when adopting a basket-peg, the values of weights in the basket 01/09/05 
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affect the level of welfare loss.  The optimal values of weights are those 
that minimize the loss, given the policy objective (loss) function.  The 
common practice of choosing trade weights as weights in a 
currency-basket is optimal only under special conditions.  In general, the 
optimal weights in the basket depend on many partial derivatives 
(response by the private sector to exogenous changes), and are not 
equal to trade weights.     
Four, in general, the dollar-peg is not a very desirable choice.  Unless 
there are other policy tools available, the dollar-peg can attain optimality 
only when the goal is stability of the bahts-dollar exchange rate (and 
other objectives not independent from the bahts-dollar rate objective).     
Five, from our empirical analysis using Thai data, we find that in pegging to 
a basket of bahts-dollar and bahts-yen exchange rates, the optimal 
weight on the bahts-dollar exchange rate is between 0.56 and 1 
(depending on the policy goal).     
Finally, we find that using trade weights as basket weights under the 
basket–peg leads to higher losses than not using money supply at all 
under floating exchange rates, for all types of policy objective.     01/09/05 
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1.  A macroeconomic model of goods and financial markets 
 
As in Yoshino and Fujimaru腩1999腪, ours is a general equilibrium model 
comprising five markets; those for 蝀 domestic money, 蝁 domestic 
bonds,  蝂 assets denominated in dollars, 蝃 assets denominated in yen, 
and  蝄  goods and services.    There are three sectors:  蝀  the public sector 
(the government and the central bank), 蝁 the private sector, and 蝂 the 
foreign sector.  There are also three countries: the USA, Japan and 
Thailand.  We assume that Thailand is a small country.  Among other 
things, this means that the yen-dollar exchange rate is exogenous to 
Thailand.  The relationship between the bahts-yen rate, the bahts-dollar 
rate and the yen-dollar rate is   
bahts per yen  膁bahts per dollar  × dollar  per  yen. 
Or, using our notation given in Table 1,   
 
膏 膏 / $ $ e e e + = . 
Because the yen-dollar rate is exogenously constant, the bahts-dollar rate 
and bahts-yen rate always change in opposite directions in this analysis1.   
 
Table 1 
r 腆rate of interest on domestic assets      
$ r 腆rate of interest on dollar-denominated assets 
膏 r 腆rate of interest on yen-denominated assets 
e e
$ 腆expected bahts-dollar exchange rate 
$ e 腆bahts-dollar exchange rate 
                                              
1 If we wanted to consider the possibility that the yen and the dollar 
change in the same direction against the bahts (which in reality is a 
possibility), we need either a fourth country, or a dynamic model that 
depicts the process of convergence from one equilibrium to another 
during which the exogenous variable adjusts along with the endogenous 




膏 腆expected bahts-yen exchange rate 
膏 e 腆bahts-yen exchange rate   
膏 / $ e : yen-dollar exchange rate (dollar per yen) 
e e
膏 / $ : expected yen-dollar exchange rate 
$ e ∆ 腆exchange risk from holding dollar-denominated assets 
膏 e ∆ 腆exchange risk from holding yen-denominated assets     
w腆domestic  stock  of  assets       
f $ 腆private stock of dollar denominated assets 
f 膏 腆private stock of yen denominated assets 
g $ 腆public stock of dollar denominated assets 
g 膏 腆public stock of yen denominated assets  
g b 腆stock of government bonds supplied 
c b : stock of government bonds held by the central bank 
m 腆stock of money supplied   
g 腆government spending 
y 腆domestic GDP 
$ y : US GDP 
膏 y : Japanese GDP 
p 腆price of good produced domestically 
膏 p 腆price of good produced in Japan 
$ p 腆price of good produced in USA 
 
Except for the rates of interest, all variables are natural logarithm values of 
the  originals.   
We assume that the yen-denominated assets and dollar-denominated 
assets are perfect substitutes.  Bahts denominated assets are not perfect 
substitutes with either the dollar-denominated assets or the 
yen-denominated assets.  Because of these assumptions, there are three 
stock equilibrium conditions in our asset market.  All partial derivatives 
are defined to be positive.     01/09/05 
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The equilibrium condition for domestic money is 
) ( ) ( ) ( 5 4 3
$ $
$ 2 1 p w y e e r e e r r p m
e e − + + − + − − + − − = − ε ε ε ε ε
膏 膏
膏     
The left-hand side is the real value of the stock of money supplied.  The 
right-hand side is the real value of money demand.  Money demand 
depends on the domestic rate of interest, rates of interest on dollar and 
yen denominated assets, GDP and real value of stock of assets.     
Using the assumption that the yen- and dollar- denominated assets are 
perfect substitutes;   
膏 膏
膏
/ $ / $
$ e e r r
e − + = , 
this can be rewritten as 
) ( ) )( ( 5 4
$ $
$ 3 2 1 p w y e e r r p m
e − + + − + + − − = − ε ε ε ε ε        (1) 
 
The equilibrium condition for domestic bonds is 
膏 膏 膏
膏 e e p w y e e r e e r r b p b
e e c g ∆ + ∆ + − + + − + − − + − + = − 7
$
6 5 4 3
$ $
$ 2 1 ) ( ) ( ) ( β β β β β β β
The left-hand side is the real value of the stock of domestic bonds 
supplied by the government.  The right-hand side is the real value of 
demand for domestic bonds.  Because this is a small country, foreigners 
do not hold domestic bonds.  Domestic demand for domestic bonds 
depends on its own return, rates of interest on dollar- and yen- 
denominated assets, GDP and the real value of stock of assets.  The last 
two terms on the right-hand side show that demand for domestic bonds 
increase with the increase in foreign exchange risk.     
Using the assumption that the yen- and dollar- denominated assets are 
perfect substitutes, this can be rewritten as 
膏 e e p w y e e r r b p b




$ 3 2 1 ) ( ) )( ( β β β β β β β  (2) 
 
The equilibrium condition for foreign (dollar- and yen-denominated) 
bonds is   01/09/05 
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) )( ( ) ( ) ( ) (
) ( ) ( $ $







p w j y j e j e e r j e e r j r j
e e e r e e r r
e e g
e e g f f
− + + + + ∆ − − + + − + − − +
∆ − − + − − + + − = +
η η







The left-hand side is the real value of the stock of dollar- and yen- 
denominated bonds supplied.  The right-hand side is the real value of 
demand for such bonds.  This time, the demand comes from the private 
and public sectors at home.  Domestic demand for dollar- and yen- 
bonds depends on the returns as well as exchange risk on the respective 
bonds, domestic rate of interest, GDP and real value of stock of assets.  
The demand for these bonds decline with the increase in foreign 
exchange  risk.   
Using the assumption that the yen- and dollar- denominated assets are 
perfect substitutes, this can be rewritten as 
) )( ( ) ( ) )( (
) )( ( $ $
6 6 5 5 4
$ $




$ 3 2 1
p w j y j e j e e r j j r j
e e e r r
e g
e g f f
− + + + + ∆ − − + − − − +
∆ − − + − + − = +
η η




and the balance sheet of the central bank is 
g c b m $ + = .   
 
The equilibrium condition in the goods and services market is as follows.     
f
f
e r e y y p p e




膏 膏 膏 膏 + + + ∆ + − + − + +
+ + + ∆ + − + − + + + − =








4 3 2 1
) (
$ ) (
γ γ γ γ
γ γ γ γ γ γ γ
   (4) 
This is the IS equation.  Consumption depends on GDP, investment 
depends on the rate of interest.  Net exports depend on the bahts-dollar 
rate, bahts-yen rate, US GDP, Japanese GDP, domestic GDP and 
exchange  risk.   
The domestic private sector holds domestic money, domestic bonds, 
dollar-bonds and yen-bonds.  Therefore, the nominal value of assets held 
by the domestic private sector (W) which appeared in equations (1) to (3) 
is defined by the following equation.     
p p p p e e b h w 膏
膏 + + + + + = $
$        ( 5 )  
This equation is an identity that defines the stock of nominal assets, rather 01/09/05 
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than an equilibrium condition.  Due to Walras’ law in the asset market (or 
because the stock of assets in any given time is constant), only two out of 
the three equilibrium conditions (1) to (3) are independent.  From these 
two equations and equation (4), three endogenous variables are 
determined.  In deriving the reduced forms, we eliminate the equilibrium 
condition for domestic money.       
Two of the three endogenous variables are common to all the analyses 
below.  Specifically, the two endogenous variables are y and r (GDP and 
the domestic rate of interest) 2.  The remaining endogenous variable will 
differ depending on the type of exchange rate regime we consider.  
Under floating exchange rates, this endogenous variable is the 
bahts-dollar rate.  Under the dollar-peg regime and the basket-peg 
regime, it is the stock of dollar denominated assets held publicly (foreign 
exchange reserves)3.   
When the Thai monetary authorities intervene in the foreign exchange 
market under the dollar-peg regime, they intervene to maintain the 
bahts-dollar exchange rate at a constant level.  The bahts-yen rate is 
determined residually and endogenously, but is also kept constant as a 
result, given the triangle relationship between the three exchange rates 
and the exogenous determination of the yen-dollar rate4.   
Under the basket-peg regime, authorities intervene to change both the 
                                              
2 Throughout the paper, the yen-bahts exchange rate also remains an 
endogenous variable.  Changes in the yen-bahts rate can easily be 
derived from changes in the dollar-bahts rate, using the relationship 
膏 膏 / $ $ e e e + = , given 
膏 / $ e . 
 
3 Authorities are assumed to hold only the US dollar as foreign exchange 
reserves, and change the dollar into yen in global financial markets as is 
necessary  for  intervention.   
 
4   This is why it is legitimate to assume that the yen- and dollar- 
denominated assets are perfect substitutes even under the dollar-peg.     
 01/09/05 
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bahts-dollar rate and the bahts-yen rate to maintain the exchange rate of 
the bahts against a basket comprising the dollar and the yen.  Both the 
bahts-dollar and bahts-yen rates change one-to-one with the initial 
change in the yen-dollar rate.  What the authorities try to do is to cause 
these two exchange rates to change in such a way that keeps the 
weighted average of these exchange rates (i.e. the value of the basket) 
constant, given the change in the yen-dollar rate.     
Finally, under floating exchange rates, the authorities do not intervene in 
either the bahts-dollar or the bahts-yen market, leaving both of these 
exchange rates endogenous.     
 
3. The  reduced  forms 
(1) Floating exchange rates 
Assume that this small country, Thailand, allows the bahts-dollar rate to 
float freely.  The bahts-dollar exchange rate is an endogenous variable, 
while the stock of dollar holdings by the monetary authority is exogenous5.   
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where  y ,  r , 
$ e  are long-run equilibrium values which are shown in 
Appendix  1.   
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Denoting the determinant of the coefficient matrix on the left-hand side as 
e M   and assuming dominant diagonals, we have  e M 膃艏. 
 
(2) The dollar-peg 
In this case the central bank of Thailand intervenes in the foreign 
exchange market to maintain the bahts-dollar exchange rate constant.  
Its stock of foreign exchange is now an endogenous variable, and 
changes according to how much intervention is necessary.  In its place, 
the bahts-dollar exchange rate is now an exogenous variable.  The 
reduced forms are;   
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(8) 
 
Assuming dominant diagonals in calculating the determinant of the 
coefficient matrix on the left-hand side  $ M , we can see that  0 $ > M . 
 
(3) The basket peg 
The basket we consider is a weighted average of the bahts-dollar rate 
and  the  bahts-yen  rate.  Specifically,  
α ν ν = − +
膏 e e ) 1 (
$       ( 9 )  
where  菋 and 1-菋 are the weights, and 莿 is the value of the basket6.  
Because 
膏 膏 / $ $ e e e + = , we have   
膏 / $ $ ) 1 ( e e ν α − − =   and      (10) 
膏 膏 / $ e e ν α + =           ( 1 1 )  
where  1 0 ≤ ≤ν .   
Equations (7) and (8) show that, if 莿 is to be kept constant, the 
bahts-dollar and bahts-yen exchange rates each have a one-to-one 
relationship with the yen-dollar rate.  These equations also show that the 
bahts-dollar rate and the bahts-yen rate always change in opposite 
directions, if 莿 is kept constant⸠ They are both endogenous, but 
                                              
6 This type of basket is called a geometric average≤.  There are other 
types of currency-baskets, such as the arithmetic average and the 
harmonic average.    See Takagi (1992).     
 01/09/05 
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determined solely by what happens to the yen-dollar rate7.   
The goal of the Thai authority is to keep 莿 constant while the yen-dollar 
rate is determined in the international financial markets.  If the yen-dollar 
rate is constant, then the bahts-dollar and bahts-yen rates must also be 
kept constant.  If, on the other hand, the yen-dollar rate changes 
exogenously, the Thai authority must intervene in the foreign exchange 
market to move the bahts-dollar and bahts-yen rates in such a way that 
莿Ⱐor the value of the basket, remains constant.  Either way, they must 
intervene to influence both the bahts-dollar and the bahts-yen rates in just 
such a way that 莿 remains constant.  Clearly, adopting a basket-peg 
does not free the authorities from the burden of intervention.  As in the 
case of the dollar-peg, the stock of foreign exchange reserves is an 
endogenous  variable.    
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Assuming dominant diagonals in deriving the determinant of the 
coefficient matrix on the left-hand side  $ M , we have  0 $ > M . 
 
4.  Exchange rate regimes and monetary policy autonomy 
                                              
7 Recall that the yen-dollar exchange rate is exogenous to this small 
country.  We have also assumed that the bahts-yen rate is always 
endogenous.  In this particular case of a basket-peg, the bahts-dollar 
rate is also endogenous.     
 01/09/05 
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Before moving on to analyzing the relationship between policy objectives 
and the optimal exchange rate regime, it would be worth emphasizing the 
following.  Adoption of a basket-peg per se does not return monetary 
policy autonomy to a small country8.   
Monetary policy autonomy is critical in maintaining the health of an 
economy, especially one whose currency comes under attack.  In the 
currency crises that started in July 1997 in Asia, countries such as Thailand, 
South Korea and Indonesia lost their foreign exchange reserves, as a result 
of their vain attempt to defend their virtual peg to the dollar.  They also 
had to maintain high levels of interest rates.  Needless to say, this meant 
huge contractions in their money supply, which had devastating 
consequences to their domestic economies.  The loss in monetary policy 
autonomy turned a currency crisis into an economic crisis.     
The only regime that assures monetary policy autonomy to a small open 
economy is a floating exchange rate regime9.  The cleaner the float, the 
more complete the monetary policy autonomy.     
But this does not mean that the degree of loss in monetary policy 
                                              
8 Every monetary authority faces a policy dilemma.  Some express this 
dilemma in the form of the “inconsistent triangle”.  This triangle has the 
three policy goals; (1) exchange rate stability, (2) monetary policy 
autonomy and (3) free movement of capital and goods, at the three 
points.  In general, all three of the goals cannot be attained 
simultaneously.  In the case of the Asian countries that came under 
duress, they had chosen goal (3).  So they had to choose between (1) 
exchange rate stability and (2) monetary policy autonomy.  In trying to 
keep (1) they lost (2) and had to conduct a severe contractionary 
monetary policy despite the negative effects on the domestic economy.         
 
9 If a country enjoys the benefit of other countries intervening to maintain 
the fixed exchange rate between other currencies and its own currency, 
then it can have an autonomous monetary policy even under fixed 
exchange rates.  This was mostly the case for the USA under the Bretton 
Woods System, and Germany in the ERM, but is much less likely to apply 
to small countries.     
 01/09/05 
  17
autonomy is the same under the dollar-peg and the basket-peg.  Even 
though a basket-peg does not free a country from foreign exchange 
market intervention, the amount of intervention is not the same as under 
the dollar-peg.  In fact, if the currency-rates in the basket move in 
opposite directions (as they necessarily do in this model), countries do not 
have to intervene as heavily as they would under the peg to one currency.   
If instead of the peg to the dollar, the Asian countries had adopted the 
peg to a basket, and if the currencies in the basket (say the dollar and the 
yen) had moved in opposite directions against the domestic currency 
(say the bahts), they would not have had to intervene as heavily.  In the 
special case where the changes in the currency rates in the basket are 
such that their weighted average turns out automatically to be zero, the 
country with the basket-peg does not have to intervene in the foreign 
exchange market.  In this case, the county fully recovers monetary 
policy autonomy even as it pegs its currency to a basket.  Such a state 
may not last very long.  But if only by a fluke, at least temporarily, 
monetary policy autonomy returns to a small open economy without 
adopting flexible exchange rates10.   
There is another possibility under a basket-peg regime to recover 
monetary policy autonomy.  This possibility arises by adjusting the 
weights on the different exchange rates in the currency basket.  Even if 
the weighted average of changes in the rates in the basket does not turn 
out to be zero under one set of weights, it may do so under another set of 
weights.  This suggests that by adjusting the weights in the basket after 
each change in the currency exchange rates, to values such that the 
value of the basket remains constant, the authorities do not have to 
intervene until the next change in the currency rates.  This is not a very 




realistic option, however, because the authorities may have to constantly 
change the weights.  In the next section we consider adjusting the 
weights, not to maintain the value of the basket but to minimize the loss 
function  itself.   01/09/05 
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5腄Policy objectives and optimal exchange rate regimes 
 
In as much as policy decisions are made with the objective in mind, the 
choice of an exchange rate regime should depend on the policy authority’s 
objective function.  In this section we scrutinize this dependence.   
Specifically, we clarify the difference in the way the policy objective variables 
are affected by an exogenous shock under floating, dollar-peg and 
basket-peg regimes.  The policy objectives we consider are the stability in 
GDP, current account and the bahts-dollar exchange rate.     
One purpose of this theoretical exercise is to emphasize that the relative 
desirability of different exchange rate regimes depends on the country’s policy 
goal.  It is not productive to try to determine whether a small open economy 
such as Thailand should adopt a basket-peg without first specifying its policy 
goal.   
Another novelty of the analysis in this chapter is the optimization with respect 
to the weights in the currency basket.  Conventionally, the weights on 
exchange rates in the basket were treated as some fixed value.  But whether 
this is optimal depends on the policy objective.  If instead policy authorities 
set these weights at values that minimize the objective function, a basket-peg 
regime can be even more desirable.     
Tables 1 and 2 below provide the summary of our results1.  We discuss the 
relative superiority of the different regimes in our empirical analysis in section 6.   
Throughout the analysis, the exogenous shock to the economy is the change 
in the yen-dollar exchange rate, which was, is and will remain a serious 
exogenous event for small open economies in Asia.     
 
                                                  
1  In this paper we do not consider the case where the policy authority wants to 
stabilize more than one macroeconomic variable at a time.  This is because 
there is at most one policy variable under all of the exchange rate regimes 
which we compare.     01/09/05 
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(1) Trade balance equilibrium as the policy objective   
We begin with a special case.  In analyses of currency baskets, often the 
trade weights (exports plus imports with a particular trade-partner country 
divided by overall exports plus imports) are used as the weights on the 
currencies in the basket2.   In fact, Gan Yeo and Lim (1999) find that Singapore 
uses trade weights as the weights in its currency basket.  But as we show in 
the analyses below, optimal currency weights are often complicated functions 
of partial derivatives.  The purpose of this subsection is to show one set of 
sufficient conditions for trade weights to be indeed the optimal weights in a 
currency basket, and thereby emphasize how special such a case is.         
Assume that the small country (Thailand) cares only about its trade.  The 
country’s authority’s loss function can be described as   
2 ) ( R T TR L − =         ( 1 3 )  
where TR is Thailand’s total trade (exports plus imports) with the rest of the 
world, and  R T  is its long-run equilibrium value.  Thailand is assumed to trade 
only with the USA and Japan, whose respective trade weights are  1 w  and 
1 1 w − .    For reasons that become clear shortly, we assume that Thailand’s trade 
depends only on nominal exchange rates, and that the elasticity of total trade 
with respect to the nominal exchange rate takes the same value  ε  for trade 
with USA and trade with Japan.    Then we have 
) ( ) 1 ( ) ( 1
$ $
1
膏 膏 e e w e e w R T TR − − + − = − ε ε .      ( 1 4 )  
In the following subsections, we compare the performance of different 
exchange rate regimes in minimizing loss functions such as equation (13).    But 
here, we consider only one exchange rate regime, the basket-peg, because 
                                                                                                                                                
 
2  See for instance Kan (1999).  Kan (1995, Chapter 7) notes that Black (1976) 
also suggests using trade-weights while Branson and Katseli-Papaefstratiou 
(1980) suggest use of market dominance in export and import markets.  Kan 
(1995, Chapter 7) argues that the weight on the yen in a basket should be the 
ratio of “response of production to changes in the yen-dollar rate” to 
“response of production to adjustment in the domestic exchange rate”.     01/09/05 
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the purpose is to show a set of conditions under which the trade weights turn 
out to be the optimal currency weights in the basket.     
Substituting 
膏 / $ $ ) 1 ( e e ν α − − =  and 
膏 膏 / $ e e ν α + =   into equation (14) we have 
{ } ) ( ) 1 ( ) )( 1 (
/ $ / $
1
/ $ / $
1
膏 膏 膏 膏 e e w e e w R T TR − − + − − − = − εν ν ε .   (15) 
Substituting this into the objective function (13), the first order condition for 
minimization with respect to  ν  gives  us 
1 w = ν          ( 1 6 )  
indicating that the optimal weights are indeed the trade weights. 
This case is definitely a special case, which satisfies the following conditions; 
蝀 the country’s objective is to minimize fluctuations in the value of total trade, 
蝁 exports and imports depend only on nominal exchange rates and 蝂 the 
elasticity of total trade with respect to the nominal exchange rate is the same 
for all trade-partner countries whose currencies are in the basket, 蝃 there are 
only two trading partners whose currencies are the only two currencies in the 
basket, and 蝄 the shock to the economy takes the form of a change in the 
exchange rate between the two currencies in the basket.     
These are not necessary conditions, and there be other cases in which trade 
weights are optimal as currency weights.  However, the following analyses 
show that, under several different policy goals, the optimal values for currency 
weights are functions of partial derivatives which would not in general be 
equal to trade weights.     
 
(2) GDP stability as the policy objective 
Now we begin comparing different exchange rate regimes for each policy 
objective3.  Consider the case where the Thai government wants to minimize 
fluctuations in GDP.    The loss function which the authorities minimize is   
2 ) ( y y L − = .             ( 1 7 )  
                                                  
3   Here in the text we only state the results.  Appendix 2 contains the 
mathematical expressions.   
 01/09/05 
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We will compare the effect of an exogenous change in the yen-dollar rate on 
this loss function, under floating exchange rates, the dollar-peg and the 
basket-peg.    
The yen-dollar rate changes from 
膏 / $ e to 
膏 / $ e .  If the country does not have 
a dollar-peg regime, the bahts-dollar rate fluctuates along with the yen-dollar 
rate.  So does the bahts-yen rate.  The bahts-dollar and bahts-yen 
fluctuations imply increased exchange risk, which is damaging to GDP.  If the 
country does have a dollar-peg regime, and the yen-dollar rate change is in 
the direction of a stronger dollar, authorities must sell dollars and buy bahts to 
maintain the fixed parity (unless for some reason the bahts –yen rate moves in 
such a way that the bahts-dollar rate naturally remains constant).  The 
resulting loss in foreign exchange reserves can lead to higher expectation of 
devaluation.    This also means higher exchange risk.    Therefore, in general the 
effect of the original change in the yen-dollar rate on GDP can be divided into 
four parts, some of which are not present under some exchange rate regimes;   
蝀 direct effect of the original yen-dollar exchange rate change (expression 
蝀 in each subsection of Appendix 2). 
蝁 indirect effect of increased exchange risk due to the induced swing in the 
bahts-dollar exchange rate on all four markets (goods, domestic bonds, 
dollar-denominated assets and yen-denominated assets) (expression 蝁 in 
each subsection of Appendix 2, where applicable). 
蝂 indirect effect of increased exchange risk due to the induced swing in the 
bahts-yen exchange rate on all four markets (goods, domestic bonds, 
dollar-denominated assets and yen-denominated assets) (expression 蝂 in 
Appendix 2).   
蝃 indirect effect of an increased expectation of devaluation of the bahts 
against the dollar, due to loss of foreign exchange reserves (expression 蝃 in 
each subsection of Appendix 2, where applicable). 
We examine the relative superiority of the flexible, the dollar-peg and the 
basket-peg regimes using Thailand’s data below.  In this section we indicate 01/09/05 
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which of the four effects exists under each of the three regimes, and discuss 
their relative strengths.     
Under flexible exchange rates (between the dollar and the bahts), we have 
the first three effects.  In contrast, under the dollar-peg regime, the second 
and fourth of these effects do not exist, if the market believes the fixed rate 
can be maintained.  In such a case, the larger the effects of exchange risk, 
the smaller the GDP fluctuation under the dollar-peg than under floating4.  
However if loss of foreign exchange reserves leads the market to expect the 
peg will be abandoned, the fourth effect will be present.  And if the peg is 
indeed abandoned, the second effect will also come into play.  Therefore we 
can conclude that in comparing the flexible and dollar-peg regimes, the latter 
is more conducive to GDP stability if it is credible and can be maintained.     
Under a basket-peg, the bahts-dollar exchange rate fluctuates.  Therefore, 
GDP changes comprise the first three effects, as in the case of flexible 
exchange rates.  However, given the yen-dollar rate, the bahts-dollar rate 
and the bahts-yen rate always change in opposite directions.    Because of this, 
compared to the dollar-peg, the direct effect on the current account (and 
hence the direct effect on GDP) is smaller 5 .  With the dollar-peg, the 
bahts-yen rate reflects the total change in the yen-dollar rate.  This affects 
Thai exports to Japan, and hence Thai GDP.  But with the basket, the 
                                                  
4  This provides an important reminder that, even though monetary policy 
cannot be employed to stabilize GDP under fixed exchange rates, it may be 
the case that the original GDP fluctuation may be smaller under fixed 
exchange rates than under flexible exchange rates.    The superiority of floating 
over fixed exchange rates on account of autonomous use of monetary policy 
presupposes that whatever changes in GDP will be successfully and 
completely offset by such policy.  As we confirm in our empirical analysis, 
obviously if monetary policy is used to minimize the loss function, losses are 
zero under flexible exchange rates.  If for some reason, monetary policy is 
only partially (or not at all) effective, then the superiority does not necessarily 
hold true.     
 
5  In Appendix 2, this is reflected in the first row of the matrix in the numerator of 
the expression for total loss under the basket peg.     01/09/05 
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bahts-dollar rate absorbs part of the change in the yen-dollar rate.   
Furthermore, because the bahts-dollar and bahts-yen rates change in 
opposite directions, Thai exports to the USA and Japan are affected in 
opposite directions, assuming that trade with the USA is denominated in US 
dollars and trade with Japan is denominated in yen.  This last assumption is a 
rather important one6.  It shows that, if a small open economy like Thailand 
wished to benefit from the introduction of a basket currency, it must diversify 
the use of foreign currencies to include the different currencies in the basket.  
The basket-peg will serve to stabilize GDP more if the economy is equally 
exposed to all exchange rates within the basket7.   
The fourth effect, i.e. the increase in expectation of devaluation due to loss in 
foreign exchange reserves is smaller with the basket-peg than the dollar-peg.  
The reason is because the two exchange rates in the basket move in opposite 
directions.  In fact, we mentioned in section that if the two rates move in just 
such a way that their weighted average turns out to be zero, no intervention is 
necessary.   
This brings our attention to the choice of weights.  Until now, we have treated 
the weights in the basket as unknown and fixed.  But the weights on 
currencies in the basket (菋 and 1-菋) can be considered an additional policy 
tool, while monetary policy is busy intervening to maintain the value of the 
basket.  They are exogenous variables that can be chosen by the policy 
                                                                                                                                                
 
6 In reality, 80 to 85% of Thai trade takes place in US dollars, while only 6 to 8% 
is in yen.     
 
7  As for the indirect effects, the comparison is less clear because it depends 
on how market perceptions of risk change.    Under the dollar-peg, the 
perceived risk is likely to increase, but only with regard to the bahts-yen rate.   
Under the basket-peg, perceived risk will increase not just due to the 
bahts-yen rate change but also the bahts-dollar rate change.    The combined 
effects on GDP may be smaller than the sole effect of increased bahts-yen 
exchange rate risk, if the economy is dependent on the bahts-yen and 
bahts-dollar exchange rates in such a way that the effects of their changes 
cancel each other out.    But this is a hypothetical situation.     01/09/05 
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authorities, to minimize the loss arising from given shocks to the economy.  
With this in mind, we calculate the optimal value of one of the weights (the 
value of the other follows because there are only two currencies in the basket 
and the sum of the two weights are one).     
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where  ) (
/ $ / $ 膏 膏 e e −  and  ) (
$ $ e e ∆ − ∆ show, respectively, the initial change in 
the yen-dollar exchange rate and the induced increase in exchange risk.     
We can see that the optimal weights depend on the following partial 
derivatives:   
(i) response of domestic bond demand to changes in the domestic interest 
rate ( 1 β ) 
(ii) response of domestic bond demand to changes in the returns on foreign 
bonds ( 2 β , 3 β ) 
(iii) response of domestic bond demand to changes in real wealth ( 5 β ) 
(iv) response of domestic bond demand to changes in exchange risk ( 7 β ) 
(v) response of domestic investment to changes in the domestic interest rate 
( 2 γ ) 
(vi) response of demand for domestic product to changes in real exchange 
rates ( 4 γ , 8 γ ) 
(vii) response of demand for domestic product to changes in real exchange 
rates ( 11 γ ).   
If the value given in equation (18) is chosen, the basket-peg can achieve the 
goal of GDP stabilization.  True, there may be occasions in which the 
right-hand-side of equation (18) happens to equal the trade-weight of a given 
country.  But this cannot expect to be true in general.  It follows that if the 
policy objective is GDP stability, choosing trade-weights as weights on the 01/09/05 
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corresponding exchange rate in the basket does not have theoretical support.  
The obvious problem is the complexity of calculating values such as the on 
given by equation (18).  Countries that choose to use trade-weights as 
weights in the basket are doing so out of convenience more than anything 
else8.   
 
(3) Current account stability as the policy objective 
Some countries choose current account stability as their policy objective.  In 
that case, the objective function is 
()
2 a c ca L − = .         ( 1 9 )  
The current account is affected by the yen-dollar rate through four possible 
effects, as in the case when GDP stability is the policy goal in subsection (2) 
above.  The effects that exist are 蝀,  蝁 and 蝂 under floating exchange 
rates,  蝀,  蝁 and 蝃under the dollar-peg and 蝀,  蝁 and 蝂 under the 
basket-peg.   
The difference with the case of the GDP objective is that here the direct effect 
(蝀) is itself a set of four effects, a subset of which exists under the different 
regimes.    These four effects are  蝀–a: direct effect of the yen-dollar rate swing, 
蝀-b: indirect effect through effects on GDP, 蝀–c: indirect effect through 
effects on the bahts-dollar rate and 蝀-d: indirect effect through changes in 
foreign exchange reserves.  Under floating exchange rates, effects 蝀–a, b 
and c exist.  Under both the dollar-peg and the basket-peg, effects 蝀–a, b 
and d exist.  Effect 蝀 –d and effect 蝀 –a work in opposite directions.   
Comparing the dollar-peg and the basket-peg, effect 蝀–a is smaller under 
the latter.     
                                                  
8  That trade-weights are not necessarily the ideal weights in a currency basket 
is in fact an intuitive argument.  Currencies are not used solely as medium of 
exchange in trade.  They are also used as store of value, a fact that is 
reflected in our general equilibrium model.  If exchange rate stability is 
desired for more purposes than stability in trade, it is easy to see that 
trade-weights will not serve well.     01/09/05 
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  (20) 
We can see that the optimal weight depends on the following.     
(i) response of domestic bond demand to changes in the domestic interest 
rate ( 1 β ) 
(ii) response of domestic bond demand to changes in the returns on foreign 
bonds ( 2 β , 3 β ) 
(iii) response of domestic bond demand to changes in real wealth ( 5 β ) 
(iv) response of domestic bond demand to changes in exchange risk ( 7 β ) 
(v) response of domestic bond demand to changes in GDP ( 4 β ) 
(vi) response of domestic investment to changes in the domestic interest rate 
( 2 γ ) 
(vii) response of demand for domestic product to changes in real exchange 
rates ( 4 γ , 8 γ ) 
(viii) response of demand for domestic product to changes in exchange risk 
( 11 γ ) 
(ix) response of demand for domestic product to changes in GDP ( 10 γ ).   
(x) response of foreign bond demand to changes in the domestic interest rate 
( 1 η ) 01/09/05 
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(xi) response of foreign bond demand to changes in the rate of return on 
foreign investment ( 3 2 η η − ,  3 2 j j − ) 
(xii) response of foreign bond demand to changes in GDP ( 5 5 j + η ) 
(xiii) response of domestic bond demand to changes in real wealth ( 6 6 j + η )   
 
(4) Exchange rate stability as the policy objective 
We assume that the policy goal is to stabilize the bahts-dollar rate.  The 
objective function is   
()
2 $ $ e e L − = .         ( 2 1 )  
Evidently, the best choice is the regime that fixes the bahts-dollar rate at a 
constant level.  Compared to the dollar peg, the basket peg is inferior unless 
the weight on the US dollar ν  is set to 1.  This is confirmed by solving the 





 for ν , which gives us 
  1 = ν .9            ( 2 2 )  
 
  (5) Policy objectives and optimal regimes; a summary 
Table 1 is a summary of our results so far.  One obvious result is that the 
optimality of the different exchange rate regimes depends on the policy goal.  
Further, the weights on currency rates in the basket can be used as a policy 
tool.  The value of the optimal weight in a basket depends on the policy 
objective.  Table 2 shows the different partial derivatives that affect such 
optimal weights.  For convenience, the table also shows which partial 
derivatives are found to affect the optimal weights in our empirical analysis in 
the next section.  Clearly, these weights depend in a complicated manner on 
reactions by many agents and in general do not coincide with trade weights.       
 
 
                                                  
9  Appendix 2 (3) contains the details.   01/09/05 
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膃膃膃膃膃膃 Table 1 The effects that exist under each regime膄膄膄膄膄膄 
 
Objective function  regime  蝀  蝁  蝂  蝃 
floating  膚  膚  膚  
Dollar-peg  膚   膚  膚 
 
GDP 
Basket-peg  膚(small)  膚  膚  
floating  膚  膚  膚  
Dollar-peg  膚   膚  膚 
 
Current account 
Basket-peg  膚(small)  膚  膚  
floating   膚    
Dollar-peg        
 
Bahts-dollar exchange 
rate  Basket-peg  膚      
 
 
膃膃膃膃 Table 2 factors that affect the optimal weight in a basket膄膄膄膄 
 







Response of domestic 
bond demand to change 
in domestic interest rate   
芘 ✓  芘 ✓   
Response of domestic 
bond demand to change 
in return on foreign bonds 
芘 ✓  芘 ✓   
Response of domestic 
bond demand to change 
in real wealth 
芘   芘    
Response of domestic 
bond demand to change 
in exchange risk 
芘   芘   
Response of domestic 
bond demand to change 
in GDP 
  芘   
Response of investment to 
change in domestic 
interest rate 
芘 ✓  芘 ✓   01/09/05 
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Response of goods 
demand to changes in real 
exchange rates 
芘 ✓  芘 ✓   
Response of goods 
demand to change in 
exchange risk 
芘   芘   
Response of demand to 
change in GDP 
  芘 ✓   
Response of foreign bond 
demand to change in 
interest rate 
  芘   
Response of foreign bond 
demand to change in 
return on foreign bonds 
  芘✓   
Response of foreign bond 
demand to change in GDP 
  芘✓   
Response of foreign bond 
demand to change in real 
wealth 
  芘   
芘腆theoretically shown to affect 
✓腆empirically shown to affect using Thai data 
 
 
6腄Empirical analysis using Thai data 
 
We use Thailand’s annual data from 1971 to 1999, and the Instrumental 
Variables Method to estimate the equations in the theoretical part of our paper.   
The results are shown in Table 3.  Because the exogenous variables are 
different according to whether floating or fixed exchange rates are adopted, 
we have two sets of results. 
The functions we estimated are the consumption function, the investment 
function, the export function (to the USA and to Japan), the import function 
(from the USA and from Japan), the demand function for domestic bonds, the 
demand function for foreign bonds, the demand function for money.  The fist 
column of the table shows the explanatory variables.  The second column 
shows the coefficients, the third column the t-values.    Two asterisks on t-values 
indicate the level of significance is 1%, one asterisk indicates it is 5%.     01/09/05 
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Thailand had fixed exchange rates against the US dollar, but has been 
devaluing since 1981.  To take this fact into account, we introduced a 
coefficient dummy on the exchange rate for the periods before 1983 and after 
1984.  We also introduced a constant dummy variable in estimating the 
investment function for 1986 and 1987, because there was a marked drop in 
investment during these years.  For exchange risk, we used the variance of 
monthly exchange rate data as proxy.     
 













constant (c )  1314  1.198  1055  .9027 
Lending rate 
(LRATE) 
377.4 2.879**  340.6 2.354** 
One-year dollar 
return  (YLDUS) 
-257.1 -1.869*  -192.7 -1.069 
One-year yen 
return (YLDJPN) 
-332.8 -2.559**  -325.2 -2.565** 
GDP (GDP)  -1.243  -5.917** -1.186  -5.152** 
Real wealth 
(RWEALTH) 
970.6 7.924**  971.5 8.190** 
Dollar exchange 
risk  (RSIKDOLL) 
7.926 .0466  -34.03  -.1861 
Yen exchange risk 
(RISKYEN) 
-.5706E-05 -2.057** -.5073E-05 -1.1725* 
R-squared .9225    .9272   
Adjusted 
R-squared 
.8838   .8908  
Durbin-Watson 3.503    3.458   
 
 
















.155 .2261  -.0104  -.1367 
One-year dollar 
return  (YLDUS) 
.1304 1.778*  .2066 2.034** 
One-year yen 
return (YLDJPN) 
-.0990 -1.466  -.1029 -1.435 
GDP(log) (LNGDP)  1.332  6.745**  1.472  6.101** 
Real wealth (log) 
(LNRWEALTH) 
-.1409 -.6322  -.1447 -.6118 
Dollar exchange 
risk 腩 log 腪 
(LNRSIKDOLL) 




.3850 2.913**  .4740 2.970** 
R-squared .9821   .9799   
Adjusted 
R-squared 
.9695   .9658  













constant (c )  .1744  2.946**  .1739  2.938** 
GDP(log) (LNGDP)  .9116  90.41**  .9117  90.41** 
Real wealth (log) 
(LNRWEALTH) 
-.0453 -2.091**  -.0454 -2.097** 
R-squared .9991   .9991   
Adjusted 
R-squared 
.9990   .9990  













constant (c )  3.443  7.824**  3.535  7.893** 
Constant dummy 
(1986) (D3) 
-1.910 -3.904**  -1.953 -3.959** 
Constant dummy 
(1987) (D4) 
-2.843 -6.156**  -2.868 -6.167** 
Money market 
rate (MMRATE) 
-.0692 -1.807*  -.0775 -1.987** 
R-squared .7826   .7801   
Adjusted .7324    .7294   01/09/05 
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R-squared 
Durbin-Watson 2.272    2.299   
 















1.93 2.162**  -6.295  2.877** 
USGDP (log) 
(LNUSGDP) 
3.42 12.11**  5.098  11.55** 
Exchange rate 
dummy after 1981 
(LNDRBDEX) 
-.1.07 -5.154**  -.4096  -2.244** 
Exchange rate 
dummy after 1984 
(LND1RBDEX) 
-.69 -2.682**  -.6349  -3.059** 
Dollar exchange 
risk 腩 log 腪 
(LNRSIKDOLL) 




.1330E+10 .9664  .0529  .4992 
R-squared .9645   .9958   
Adjusted 
R-squared 
.9543   .9933  
Durbin-Watson .8984    1.859   
 















-9.13 -.4645  -1.208 -2.394** 
Japanese GDP 
(log) (LNUSGDP) 





.2329E+07 .2.134** .1941E-02 .2263E-02 
Exchange rate 
dummy after 






腩 log 腪 
(LNRSIKDOLL) 




.1142E+03 .0673  -.0398  -.1399 
R-squared .9752    .9571   
Adjusted 
R-squared 
.9604   .9314  
Durbin-Watson 1.279    2.147   
 















1.014 .5328  3.154 .9231 
GDP(log) (LNGDP)  1.355  9.750**  1.510  6.229** 
Exchange rate 
dummy after 1984 
(LND1RBDEX) 
-2360 -1.5336  -.4197  -1.483 
Dollar exchange risk
腩 log 腪 
(LNRSIKDOLL) 
.0205 .4706  .3059E-02  .0580 
Yen exchange risk 
(log) (LNRISKYEN) 
-.0808 -.7533  -.0263 -.1983 
R-squared .9779    .9751   
Adjusted R-squared  .9679    .9638   


















-.8076 -3.253**  -.7628 -2.790** 
GDP(log) 
(LNGDP) 






.3169 2.300**  .5190 2.508** 
Dollar exchange 
risk 腩 log 腪 
(LNRSIKDOLL) 




.0669 .9931  .1582 10608 
R-squared  .9845   .9815  
Adjusted 
R-squared 
.9774   .9731  
Durbin-Watson  1.172   1.779  
 
Using the estimated coefficients10, we calculated the basket weights that 
minimize the loss functions corresponding to the three different policy goals.  
The result is shown in Table 4, where we show only the optimal weights on the 
bahts-dollar exchange rate.  The optimal weights on the bahts-yen exchange 
rate can easily be found by subtracting the optimal weights on the 
bahts-dollar exchange rate from 1.     
 
膃膃膃膃膃膃  Table 4 Optimal weights  膄膄膄膄膄膄 
Policy objective    ν  
GDP 0.61 
Current account    0.56 
Bahts-dollar exchange rate    1 
 
Also by using the estimated coefficients, we compared the values of loss 
functions under the floating, dollar-peg and basket-peg regimes11.  For the 
                                                  
10  Coefficients that were not significant at the 1% level were set equal to zero.  
In particular, we found that coefficients on exchange rate risk were not 
significant.  This may be due to the fact that Thailand had a fixed exchange 
rate regime during all but the very end of the period of our estimation.     
 
11  In the empirical analysis, we omitted the indirect effect of the induced 
expectation for devaluation under the dollar-peg regime for lack of adequate 
data.   01/09/05 
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floating exchange rates and basket-peg regimes, we considered two cases, 
one sub-optimal and one optimal.  The sub-optimal case for floating 
exchange rates is when money supply is not changed at all, in spite of the fact 
that it is available as a policy tool.    The sub-optimal case for the basket-peg is 
when the weights are the trade-weights.  In the latter case, we used Thai data 
to find that ν  is equal to 0.4.  The welfare consequences are shown in Table 
5.   
As expected, both regimes attain zero loss when the respective policy 
variables take the optimal values.  The dollar-peg attains zero loss when the 
objective is stability in the bahts-dollar rate.  Also, our results indicate that 
using trade-weights as basket-weights under the basket-peg leads to higher 
losses than using no monetary policy at all under floating exchange rates.     
 
 








(no change in 





















2 / $ ) 62 . 0 (
膏 e  
2.16 
2 / $ ) 05 . 2 (









2 / $ ) 016 . 0 (
膏 e  
0.0014 
2 / $ ) 63 . 6 (







2 / $ ) 15 . 0 (
膏 e −  
0.13 
0 0 
2 / $ ) 6 . 0 (
膏 e  
2.02 
0 
膏 / $ e indicates size of the original dollar-yen rate change, 艱indicates the 
resulting rise in the bahts-yen exchange rate risk.    Italic entries are when 
膏 / $ e  
and  艱  are averages of the relevant period.     01/09/05 
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7. The  Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Deriving the equilibrium values in reduced forms of Section 3 
The equilibrium values that appear in the reduced forms shown in Section 3-(1) 
are as follows 
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Appendix 2: Policy objectives and optimal exchange rate regimes 
In section 4 we discussed the direct and indirect effects of an exogenous 
yen-dollar rate changes from 
膏 / $ e to 
膏 / $ e .  This part of the appendix contains 
mathematical expressions that support the arguments.     
 
(1) GDP stability as the policy objective 
  Floating exchange rates 
蝀 Direct effect of the original dollar-yen exchange rate swing 
The direct effect of this dollar-yen rate on GDP is   
2 / $ / $
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蝁 Indirect effect of increased exchange risk due to the induced swing 
in the baths-dollar exchange rate 
The changes in dollar-yen rate induces the change in bahts-dollar 
rate as 
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This will increase market participants’ perception of exchange risk. 
Assume that the increase in the perceived exchange risk is from 
$ e ∆ to 
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蝂 Indirect effect of an increased exchange risk due to the induced 01/09/05 
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swing in the baths-yen exchange rate 
From the triangular relationship 
膏 膏 / $ $ e e e + = , the baths-yen rate 
changes by    ) ( ) ( ) (
/ $ / $ $ $ 膏 膏 膏 膏 e e e e e e − + − = − 1 or  
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This will increase market participants’ perception of baths-dollar 
exchange risk. Assume the increase is from 
膏 e ∆ to 
膏 e ∆ .  Then the 
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The fourth effect (i.e. the indirect effect of an increased expectation of 
devaluation of the bahts against the dollar) does not exist under floating 
exchange rates.  Therefore, in order to derive the value of the loss function, we 
simply add losses arising from 蝀,  蝁 and 蝂 and square the sum.  The value 
of the loss function (total loss) under flexible exchange rates is 
2
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.   
 
Under flexible exchange rates, monetary policy is available as a policy tool. 
What policy authorities should do when a loss arises is to minimize this loss using 
monetary policy.   
The optimal open market operation which minimizes this loss is 
                                                  
1  Note that since baths-dollar rate and yen-dollar rate changes different 
direction, the change in baths-yen rate will be very small. 01/09/05 
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When this policy is conducted, the value of loss function is 
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and this value is confirmed in our empirical analysis to be equal to zero.     
 
  The dollar-peg 
蝀 Direct effect of the original yen-dollar rate swing 
The direct effect of the dollar-yen rate on GDP is   
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The second indirect effect (i.e. effect of increased exchange risk 
due to swing in the bahts-dollar rate) does not exist under the 
present  regime.   
蝂 Indirect effect of increased exchange risk due to the induced swing   
in the baths-yen exchange rate 
Since  ) ( ) ( ) (
/ $ / $ $ $ 膏 膏 膏 膏 e e e e e e − + − = −  and  0 ) (
$ $ = −e e , the 
entire change in dollar-yen rate translates into the change in the 
baths-yen rate as 
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This will increase market participants’ perception of baths-yen 
exchange risk.  Assume the increase is from 
膏 e ∆ to 
膏 e ∆ .  The 
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蝃 Indirect effect of an increased expectation of devaluation 
In the case of an appreciation of the dollar against the yen, foreign 
exchange reserves decrease by 
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  The basket peg 
蝀 Direct effect of the original yen-dollar exchange rate swing 
The direct effect of the dollar-yen change is   
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蝁 Indirect effect of increased exchange risk due to the induced swing 
in the baths-dollar exchange rate 
The change in the dollar-yen rate induces the bahts-dollar rate to 
change as follows: 
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Assume this will increase perceived exchange risk from 
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蝂 Indirect effect of increased exchange risk due to the induced swing 
in the baths-yen exchange rate 
As a result of the dollar-yen rate change, the bahts-yen rate 
changes as  ) ( ) (
/ $ / $ 膏 膏 膏 膏 e e e e − = − ν .   
Assume this will increase the perceived bahts-yen exchange risk 
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(2) Current account stability as the policy objective 
The current account consists of the trade balance and net investment income.2 
Thus  
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  Floating exchange rates 
In the case of flexible exchange rates, the divergence of the current account 
from its equilibrium value can be expressed as: 
                                                  
2  Current account = Merchandise Trade balance + Invisible balance ( Export 
Import of services + Net investment income) + Unilateral transfer. Here, we 
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Evidently, there are three components to this divergence: 
蝀 The effect from the original yen-dollar exchange rate swing 
The yen-dollar exchange rate can affect CA directly, through GDP 
and through the bahts-dollar rate swing. 
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the first term corresponds to  蝀–b, the second term corresponds to   
蝀-c and the third term corresponds to  蝀-a in the text.     
蝁 Indirect effect of increased exchange risk due to the induced swing 
in the bahts-dollar rate 
The change in the dollar-yen rate induces the change in the 
bahts-dollar rate and thus, increases the perception of exchange 
risk from 
$ e ∆ to 
$ e ∆ .    The effect on the current account is 01/09/05 
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蝂 Indirect effect of increased exchange risk due to the induced swing 
in the baths-yen rate 
The change in the dollar-yen rate induces the change in the 
bahts-yen rate, and thus increases the perceived exchange risk 
from 
膏 e ∆ to 
膏 e ∆ .    The effect on the current account is 
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The total loss (value of the loss function) is the squared value of the sum of 
effects  蝀 to 蝂 above.   
 
Under floating exchange rates, monetary policy is available as a tool to 
minimize this loss. The optimal monetary policy is   
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Again, the value of the loss function is zero when this value is substituted into it.     
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  The dollar Peg 
In the case of the dollar-peg system, the divergence of the current account 
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There are three components, which are effects  蝀,  蝁 and 蝃.   
蝀 The effect from the original yen-dollar exchange rate swing 01/09/05 
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The yen-dollar rate can affect the current account directly, through 
GDP and through changes in foreign reserves.     
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the first term corresponds to 蝀–b, the second term corresponds to 
蝀-d and the third term corresponds to  蝀-a in the text.     
蝂 Indirect effect of increased exchange risk due to the baths-yen   
exchange rate swing 
Under the dollar peg, the baths-yen rate changes by 
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/ $ / $ 膏 膏 膏 膏 e e e e − = − .  This induces the perceived exchange risk 
to change from 
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蝃 Indirect effect of an increased expectation of evaluation 
In the case of an appreciation of the dollar against the yen, foreign 
exchange reserves decreases.  Assume this decrease in foreign 





This increase in the devaluation expectation will affect the current 
account by   01/09/05 
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The total loss (value of the loss function) is the squared value of the sum of 
effects  蝀,  蝁 and  蝃 above.   
 
  The basket peg 
Under the basket peg system, since 
膏 / $ $ ) 1 ( e e ν α − − =  and 
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Evidently, there are three components to this divergence: 
蝀 The direct effect of the original yen-dollar exchange rate swing 
The yen-dollar exchange rate swing affects the current account 
directly, through GDP and through changes in foreign reserves.  
Thus  01/09/05 
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the first term corresponds to 蝀–b, the second term corresponds to 
蝀-d and the third term corresponds to  蝀-a in the text.     
蝁 Indirect effect of increased exchange risk due to the induced swing 
in the baths-dollar rate 
Assuming the perceived exchange risk increases from 
$ e ∆ to 
$ e ∆ , 
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蝂 Indirect effect of increased exchange risk due to the induced swing 
in the baths-yen rate 
Assuming the perceived exchange risk increases from 
膏 e ∆ to 
膏 e ∆ , 
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The total loss (value of the loss function) is the squared value of the sum of 
effects  蝀 to 蝂 above.   
 
(3) Exchange rate stability as the policy objective 
  Floating exchange rates 
When the dollar-yen rate changes from 
膏 / $ e to 
膏 / $ e , the value of the loss 
function is   
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膏 膏 膏 膏 膏 膏 .   
This value is the same as the value that maintains the bahts-dollar rate constant.     
 
  The dollar-peg 
Since the bahts-dollar rate is fixed, the value of loss function is   
() 0
2 $ $ = − = e e L .   
 
  The basket Peg 01/09/05 
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Using 
膏 / $ $ ) 1 ( e e ν α − − = , the change in the bahts-dollar rate is 
) )( 1 (
/ $ / $ $ $ 膏 膏 e e e e − − − = − ν .  Hence the value of loss function is 
2 / $ / $ 2 2 $ $ ) ( ) 1 ( ) (
膏 膏 e e e e L − − = − = ν .  This can be minimized by setting ν = 1, 
meaning that the optimal regime is the dollar-peg.      54
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